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ARTICLE





This article is one part of a multi-article project on the role of law in
the history of corporate responsibility in the United States. Key background
material for the project is set forth in the introduction to an earlier article
addressing corporate personhood.1 This paper deals with corporate govern-
ance while other articles cover (or will cover) corporate purpose and corpo-
rate regulation.2
Corporate responsibility concerns associated with corporate per-
sonhood, corporate purpose, and corporate regulation all ultimately relate to
a far more basic issue: corporate governance. As the commercial demands
of nineteenth century industrialization led to substantial displacement of the
partnership form of business enterprise by large corporations with dispersed
shareholders, control of these corporations—i.e., their governance—cen-
tered in the hands of senior managers, not investors themselves. This phe-
nomenon of “separation of ownership from control” is quite different than
in the typical partnership and was seminally described by Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means in their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property.3 It has continued to occupy center stage in corporate law for the
past eighty years.
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1. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Cor-
porate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 1135, 1135–40 (2012).
2. Lyman Johnson, Unsettled and Unsettling Issues in Delaware Corporate Law: The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson,
Unsettledness]; Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Cor-
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From a legal history vantage point on corporate responsibility, the stu-
pendous rise in commercial significance of the corporation in the nineteenth
century corresponded to the precipitous decline of a regulatory approach to
corporations under state corporate law,4 and instead, the twentieth century
“outsourcing” of such regulation to an array of other legal regimes designed
to protect both investor and noninvestor groups. This meant that corporate
law itself developed in such a way as to loosen, not tighten, most con-
straints on those who govern public corporations. The thesis of this article,
developed in Parts I and II, is that corporate governance, both as a body of
law and as a field of academic study, has historically had little to say on the
important subject of corporate responsibility. Instead, the quest for greater
responsibility in the United States largely has come from “external” legal
regulation and from ongoing shifts in business and social norms. Recently,
corporate law’s long and unsustainable neglect of corporate responsibility
concerns has led to the emergence of a new type of business corporation,
the “benefit corporation.” Benefit corporations expressly permit the direc-
tors to advance both investor and noninvestor interests, in aid of pursuing a
larger public benefit. The implications of this development for governance
of the regular business corporations are unknown. One potential outcome is
the “ghettoization” of corporate responsibility within benefit corporations,
leading to even less attention to such concerns in the traditional business
corporation.
I. CORPORATE LAW’S HISTORICAL NEGLECT
OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
The most famous lamentation of the deregulatory movement within
corporate law is found in Justice Louis Brandeis’ 1933 dissenting opinion in
Liggett v. Lee.5 Justice Brandeis, writing one year after publication of The
Modern Corporation and Private Property—to which he refers—chronicles
in detail how a largely suspicious regulatory stance toward corporations
gradually and entirely subsided throughout the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.6 Early in the nineteenth century, states had strictly controlled
corporate attributes and powers in numerous ways. For example, states typi-
cally limited the amount of capital a single corporation could assemble;
restricted the scope of corporate powers; limited the duration of a corpora-
tion to a period ranging, generally, from twenty to fifty years; placed limits
on company indebtedness; prohibited the holding of stock in another corpo-
ration; and gave stockholders broad veto powers over proposed transac-
tions.7 These strictures, Brandeis noted, fell away as several states earnestly
competed for new corporate charters—an important source of state reve-
4. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1159–64.
5. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 542–60; see Johnson, supra note 1, at 1144–52.
7. See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 542–60; see Johnson, supra note 1, at 1144–52.
976 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:4
nue—by adopting a low cost and deregulatory philosophy of corporate law
in which legal restrictions were curtailed and powers were enhanced. This
so-called “race” was famously, and distressingly, described by Brandeis as
being one “not of diligence but of laxity.”8
The upshot of the simultaneous rise of the commercial and socioeco-
nomic significance of the corporation and the substantial slackening of cor-
porate regulation by states meant that those who controlled corporations
possessed enormous financial and legal power. This had several important
consequences for developments pertinent to corporate responsibility. First,
the growth of concentrated power was of course directly germane to the
subject of corporate personhood. Neither large numbers of passive stock-
holders nor a handful of professional managers of gargantuan enterprises
could sensibly be equated to the “corporation” itself. After a failed but val-
iant effort during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to con-
ceive of the corporation as simply an “aggregation of individuals,”9
eventually the corporation was recognized as an institution in its own right,
and legal personhood was simply the inevitable conceptual and linguistic
acknowledgement of that phenomenon.10 Second, as to corporate purpose,11
it was centralized managerial control as well that spurred the debate, ongo-
ing today, over whether managerial duties should run singularly to stock-
holders—to ensure strict accountability to them—or should extend to a
broader group of stakeholders to ensure more socially responsible corporate
conduct. Third, given the decline of regulation within corporate law itself,
external regulation was designed to constrain the manner in which powerful
managers deployed the vast corporate resources under their control. In light
of such control, certain regulation, such as federal securities law, was point-
edly designed to protect stockholders, while other laws were designed to
protect various other vulnerable constituencies such as consumers, employ-
ees, and the natural environment.
Finally, however, as to genuine reform of the deep decision-making
architecture of corporate governance itself as a possible pathway to more
responsible corporate conduct, little truly innovative thinking—beyond the
occasional boosting of stockholder protection via federal securities law—
ever was seriously advanced until the middle of the twentieth century, when
new ideas were at least proposed even though they ultimately went no-
where. The lone academic exception prior to that time was a provocative
early 1930s debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd over the proper
8. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 560. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, the “race” debate
broadened to include arguments that, contrary to Brandeis’ view, the race was to the “top” or to
“nowhere.” See William Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TO-
RONTO L.J. 401, 401–03 (1994) (collecting scholarship).
9. Johnson, supra note 1, at 1154.
10. See id.
11. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 2, at 435–38.
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focus for directors—i.e., shareholders only or a broader group of stakehold-
ers12—but no structural governance changes immediately followed from
that debate. In short, once states had essentially abandoned corporate law
itself as a way to regulate corporate activity, they never turned back.13 The
various halting and unsuccessful efforts to broadly improve corporate con-
duct through corporate governance reform are described in Part II. Only
with the recent emergence of the benefit corporation, however, has the ef-
fort to deploy the mechanisms of corporate governance to advance corpo-
rate responsibility borne any legal fruit.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM EFFORTS
A. Mid-Twentieth Century
A glimmer of truly innovative, if fairly vague, governance reform can
be seen in Professor Abram Chayes’ 1959 essay in which he hinted that
noninvestor groups need greater “say” in corporate affairs, while also rec-
ognizing that this would not be easy to do:
A more spacious conception of “membership,” and one closer to
the facts of corporate life, would include all those having a rela-
tion of sufficient intimacy with the corporation or subject to its
power in a sufficiently specialized way. Their rightful share in
decisions on the exercise of corporate power would be exercised
through an institutional arrangement appropriately designed to re-
present the interests of a constituency of members having a sig-
nificant common relation to the corporation and its power.
It is not always easy to identify such constituencies nor is it al-
ways clear what institutional forms are appropriate for recogniz-
ing their interests. The effort to answer those questions is among
the most meaningful tasks of the American legal system.
The trail is not without its blazes, however. Among the groups
now conceived as outside the charmed circle of corporate mem-
bership, but which ought to be brought within it, the most impor-
tant and readily identifiable is its work-force . . . .
12. See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931) (arguing that corporate managers should use control for shareholder benefit); A. A. Berle,
Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) [herein-
after Berle, Corporate Managers] (arguing that corporate managers should largely serve stock-
holders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932) (arguing that corporate managers do not only owe a duty to their stockholders to
make a profit but should advance a range of broader “corporate” interests).
13. The most striking positive law exception arose in the 1980s when legislatures sought to
curb high levels of takeover activity through their corporate statutes. See infra note 33. These
statutes had a clear pro-management thrust but the point is that states in the 1980s chose to “regu-
late” a widespread economic activity thought to be socially disruptive—hostile corporate take-
overs—by means of their corporate statutes, a legislative strategy that had long lain dormant but
was successfully, if briefly, revived in that era.
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Direct worker representation on the managing board, however,
has not proved fruitful in this country, although it is being experi-
mented with in a variety of forms by different European nations.14
One proposed governance reform that surfaced periodically—and that
would serve to institutionally flesh out Professor Chayes’ suggestion—was
the suggested use of “public interest” directors on corporate boards. These
persons, in theory, would take a broader-gauged view of how a corpora-
tion’s activities affected groups other than investors.15 As noted by Profes-
sor Douglas Branson, the 1870s reorganization of the Union Pacific
Railroad board and the late twentieth century board of the Communications
Satellite Corporation included public interest directors.16 Justice William
Douglas in 1940,17 and other commentators since then,18 also have advo-
cated for public interest directors. Unlike certain European nations provid-
ing for employee representation on supervisory boards,19 however,
changing the composition of the board of directors from a completely stock-
holder-elected body to one more broadly representative of other groups
never took hold in the United States with respect to solvent companies.20
Today, only common stockholders enjoy statutory suffrage under American
corporate law.21
Other noteworthy proposed reforms of corporate governance during
the 1970s included Professor William Cary’s advocacy of federal minimum
standards for large corporations and Ralph Nader’s (and his coauthors’)
proposal for outright federal chartering of corporations.22 Concerned about
what Justice Brandeis had called a “race of laxity,”23 and that he branded a
14. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 25, 41 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
15. One problem with any “special constituency” directors—including “public interest” or
employee- or creditor-elected directors—is that all directors have fiduciary duties demanding that
they place the interests of the beneficiary of those duties above all other considerations. If those
duties run only to the “corporation,” a “special interest” director must advance the corporation’s
interests, not those of his or her electors. If the duties also run to stockholders, their interests must
be paramount. Thus, either the special interest director must argue that advancing the interests of
his or her special constituency is consistent with and advances corporate and/or stockholder well-
being, or that constituency’s interests must remain subordinate. See generally Simone M. Sepe,
Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2013).
16. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate So-
cial Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 613 (2001).
17. See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 52–53 (1940).
18. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR 157–73 (1976).
19. Detlav Vagts, Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80
HARV. L. REV. 23, 50–53 (1966).
20. For financially distressed companies, creditors, including unions and the federal govern-
ment, may have a role in selecting directors. See Sepe, supra note 15.
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211, 216 (2013).
22. See Branson, supra note 16, at 615–18.
23. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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“race to the bottom,”24 Professor Cary believed that Delaware corporate law
had degenerated so far in a deregulatory direction as to have become too
promanagement and antishareholder in orientation. The solution proposed
by Cary was to establish mandatory federal “minimum standards” that
would preempt more lax state law rules on certain key subjects.25 Cary’s
proposal did not fundamentally alter the board-centered model of corporate
governance, however, nor its focus on protecting investor interests. It
sought only to ensure that such a model adhered to certain standards im-
posed by federal law because, Cary believed, interjurisdictional competition
among states had produced intolerably low corporate law standards. Thus,
from a broad corporate responsibility perspective, Cary’s proposal was, as a
substantive matter, quite modest. Beyond generating scholarly comment,
however, the proposal at the time went nowhere, although the landmark
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act certainly embody
the principle of federal standards sought long ago by Cary.26
More ambitious was the federal chartering proposal. Nader and his co-
authors believed that the largest United States corporations should be
chartered by the federal government, not states,27 because, they reasoned,
under state law managers were not sufficiently attentive either to investor
interests or those of other constituencies. Moreover, Nader and his coau-
thors believed that such a federal corporate law should be more overtly
regulatory in philosophy and should mandate public interest directors who
would advance employee, consumer, and community welfare, as well as
heightened responsibility to stockholders. Furthermore, their proposal
would require a certain amount of periodic social auditing and reporting.28
Corporations also would, under this proposal, have only limited duration,
not perpetual—reverting on this point to early nineteenth century law—and
they would have to renew their charters every twenty or twenty-five
years.29 Like Cary’s proposal, Nader’s idea generated scholarly commen-
tary. Unlike Cary’s proposal, it also resulted in several congressional hear-
ings.30 It never went beyond that, however.
Other, later proponents of corporate social responsibility have sought
less to change the core mechanisms of corporate governance—or the source
of laws comprising them—than to work innovatively within them. At the
24. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 665–66 (1974).
25. Id. at 663.
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7201 et seq.) (2006); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641) (2010).
27. See RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
7–9 (1976). Professor Stone also advocated federal incorporation for large corporations. See
Stone, supra note 18, at 72.
28. See Branson, supra note 16, at 616.
29. See id.
30. See id.
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board level, many reformers have called for greater racial, ethnic, and gen-
der diversity on corporate boards to broaden the perspectives brought to
bear on strategic challenges.31 A 2013 study by the Conference Board, for
example, traces the rise of women and ethnic minorities serving on the
boards of nonfinancial companies, and notes that about one-half of large
companies now have a formal policy on board diversity.32 This represents a
shift in business norms and practices, however, rather than a mandated legal
change, unlike the case in certain European nations. Also, in the 1980s,
almost thirty states enacted laws permitting, but not mandating, directors to
consider various nonshareholder constituencies in making decisions.33 After
aiding in quelling hostile takeover activity during that tumultuous period,
however, these laws appear to have had little visible and enduring impact
on corporate governance.
B. Early Twenty-first Century
Since corporate law’s deregulatory turn over the course of the nine-
teenth century, the two most extensive regulatory initiatives touching on
corporate governance were not enacted until the first decade of the twenty-
first century. These were the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,34 and
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank”).35 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) grew out of the wide-
spread corporate frauds revealed at such brand name companies as Enron,
Tyco, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and many others.36 SOX took a smorgas-
bord-like approach to regulation, touching on a number of areas. For exam-
ple, SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to
oversee auditing firms, enhanced the independence of public company audi-
tors, increased financial disclosures by public corporations, regulated secur-
ities analyst conflicts of interests, and added new crimes under the
securities laws and boosted penalties for violations.37 Importantly, however,
SOX also addressed in unprecedented fashion certain subjects associated
31. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women,
People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1105, 1114 (2006). Effective February 28, 2010, the SEC amended Item 407(c) of Regulation S-K
to require public reporting companies to disclose whether, and if so how, nominating committees
consider diversity in identifying nominees for directors and also to disclose how companies assess
the effectiveness of diversity policies.
32. See Matteo Tonello, Director Compensation and Board Practices, THE CONFERENCE
BOARD (13th ed. 2013).
33. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 4:10, at 245 (3d ed. 2010).
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7201 et seq.) (2006).
35. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641) (2010).
36. See generally Lyman Johnson & Mark Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149 (2004) (describing background and overview of Act).
37. See id. at 1154.
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with corporate governance, which historically had been left to state corpo-
rate law, notwithstanding the provocative but ill-fated proposals noted ear-
lier. For example, SOX imposed new responsibilities on the audit
committee and required greater independence of committee members, pro-
hibited corporate loans to officers, enhanced requirements associated with
officer certifications of periodic reports, provided for forfeiture of certain
bonuses and profits in connection with restatements of financial statements,
and required management to assess and report on the quality of internal
controls.38
Implementation of SOX also corresponded with growth in the promul-
gation of “soft law” associated with corporate activity. Corporations in-
creasingly adopted internal codes of conduct and committee charters, and
sought to voluntarily conform to various governance metrics of “best prac-
tices.” In addition, diverse guidelines and principles were elaborated to
guide corporate behavior, and different indexes and ratings were developed
to assess the soundness of various corporate practices.39 These various non-
binding initiatives did not have the legal “bite” of positive law, but they
served to alter internally the evolving normative expectations as to what
responsible corporate conduct should look like in the twenty-first century.
Moreover, by voluntarily adopting them, corporate directors and managers
likely sought to ward off yet additional legal regulation.
The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law by President Obama on July 21,
2010, arose out of congressional concerns about the near collapse of U.S.
financial markets in the autumn of 2008, the greatest economic crisis since
the Great Depression, which itself spawned extensive regulation. During
this period in 2008, officials at the Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Trea-
sury Department essentially stepped in and directed activities at large, sys-
temically significant financial firms.40 Whether correct decisions were
made or not, their very intervention again demonstrates the profound social
stakes associated with large businesses. During this crisis, government
elites navigated companies through uncharted financial water rather than
simply defer to decisions that, historically, had been made by private sector
business elites.
Like SOX, the Dodd-Frank Act continues to extend federal law into
what was traditionally considered the province of state corporate law. For
example, under that Act public companies must give shareholders a peri-
odic nonbinding advisory vote on executive compensation (“say on pay”);41
38. See id. at 1155–85.
39. See Sanjai Bhagat, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1803 (2008).
40. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUD-
ING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 561–63 (11th ed. 2010).
41. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641) (2010).
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all the members of a company’s compensation committee must be indepen-
dent;42 disclosure of the relationship between executive compensation and
financial performance (“pay for performance”) must be made;43 the SEC
was authorized to craft rules giving shareholders greater access to the com-
pany’s proxy statement to advance shareholder nominees for membership
on the board;44 and disclosure is required as to whether, and why if so, a
company has selected the same person to serve as chair of the board of
directors and chief executive officer.45 Also, in an effort to encourage the
reporting of corporate wrongdoing, Dodd-Frank strengthens whistleblower
incentives. Under this provision, from ten to thirty percent of a monetary
recovery may be paid to someone who provides “original information”
leading to successful prosecution of an SEC enforcement action that results
in a sanction exceeding $1 million.46
These two federal regulatory efforts undoubtedly evince profound
frustration with state corporate law’s ongoing resistance to meaningful at-
tention to corporate reform. Nonetheless, they focus almost exclusively on
investor interests, not broader concerns. Thus, however unprecedented the
recent federal incursions into corporate governance might be, in fact they
continue the longstanding neglect of broad corporate responsibility by
means of corporate governance reform.
C. The Rise of Shareholder Activism
Moving from a discussion of governance reform aimed at the director
level to reform directed at the shareholder level, a key legal tool for at-
tempted governance reform is SEC Rule 14a-8,47 which has long permitted
qualified shareholders of public reporting companies to place proposals for
the annual shareholder meeting in the company’s own proxy statement.
Two key proxy initiatives taking place around 1970 used this tool of share-
holder democracy in a surprising way: not to advocate that managers pay
greater heed to shareholder well-being—the usual focus of federal securi-
ties laws—but to advocate for a broadened focus on corporate
responsibility.
Following community activist Saul Alinsky’s efforts to use share own-
ership in Eastman Kodak as a basis to attend Kodak’s annual meeting and
protest its racial hiring practices,48 anti-Vietnam War activists used Rule
14a-8 to place before Dow Chemical’s shareholders a proposal that the
42. See id. § 952.
43. Id. § 953.
44. See id. § 971.
45. See id. § 972.
46. Id. § 922.
47. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2011).
48. See C. A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 114 (2002).
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company should no longer manufacture napalm.49 The resolution garnered
less than 3 percent of the actual vote, but it achieved the larger strategic
goal of gaining extraordinary publicity for the anti-war effort.50 Campaign
GM, another movement involving the intrepid Ralph Nader, sought to
transform GM from a purely profit-seeking firm into a firm serving the
general social welfare.51 Thus, under Nader’s proposal, GM would remain
board-governed, but public interest directors would be added to the GM
board in an effort to balance the interests of various stakeholders such as
investors, employees, consumers, and the general public. The two Cam-
paign GM proposals appearing on GM’s proxy statement were fiercely op-
posed by the company and received less than 3 percent of the stockholder
vote, but, as with the Dow Chemical campaign, they succeeded in obtaining
an extraordinary amount of publicity,52 the overall strategic aim.
Widespread efforts to use the federal proxy machinery to advance
shareholder proposals seeking more socially responsible corporate conduct
continued into the twenty-first century,53 with mixed success. These pro-
posals are sponsored by various religious, environmental, labor, and con-
sumer groups, among others, and they deal with a wide range of subjects.54
Recent examples range from efforts to force companies to disclose their
political contributions,55 to PETA’s purchase of SeaWorld stock in order to
sponsor a proposal to curb what that organization considers to be animal
cruelty.56
A strikingly different “shareholder democracy” movement emerged in
the 1990s and early twenty-first century to turn, once again, to the rights of
voice and vote accorded shareholders under state corporate law. The aim
was not broad corporate social responsibility, however, but improved inves-
tor well-being. In brief, investor activists reverted to creative uses of share-
holder suffrage after the initially promising and robust market-centered
hostile takeover period of the 1980s had come to a decidedly an-
tishareholder end.57 Takeovers were widely touted during the 1980s as an
efficient, shareholder-friendly, market solution to the governance problem
49. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 432 F.2d 659, 662–63
(D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
50. See Wells, supra note 48, at 114–15.
51. See id. at 115–17.
52. See id.; see Branson, supra note 16, at 614.
53. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
238 (9th ed. 2005).
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., EXXON MOBIL CORP., 2013 PROXY STATEMENT 67–69 (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000119312513152355/d460324ddef14a.htm.
56. See Aaron Smith, PETA takes a stake in SeaWorld, demands whales be freed,
CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/24/news/companies/seaworld-peta/ (last visited Jan.
8, 2014).
57. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 40, at 519–25.
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of entrenched and complacent corporate management.58 Hostile bidders
could use tender offers, the thinking ran, to directly acquire a majority of a
company’s stock by offering stockholders a generous premium and then,
using their new found voting power, replace incumbent directors and man-
agement with more savvy, investor-oriented candidates who would alter
business strategy and/or operations. The role of law, in this view, was es-
sentially deregulatory in thrust; it was simply to make sure that incumbent
directors and managers did not wrongly impede the effective functioning of
the capital markets.59 This proposed market-based solution to traditional
corporate governance ills was itself part of the larger “law and economics”
movement that was imported from financial economics and that took deep
ideological hold of corporate law scholarship during the 1980s.60 The steely
focus on investor well-being via hostile takeovers, moreover, was congruent
with a renewed theoretical conception of the corporation that, while
pragmatically accepting legal personhood for the corporation, at the same
time, sought analytically to disaggregate the corporate institution into a
mere “nexus” of various contracting parties in which investor interests were
paramount.
Numerous factors combined to abruptly halt rampant hostile acquisi-
tion activity around 1990. These included, besides economic recession, the
demise of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.—the investment banking firm
most associated with arranging infamous “junk bond” financing of hostile
bids—and the jailing of Michael Milken, the chief financial architect at
Drexel.61 On the law front, the passage of antitakeover legislation by nu-
merous states62—including constituency statutes63—received strong judi-
cial approval from both the Supreme Court in the 1987 CTS case and the
estimable Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1989.64 Moreover, the influ-
ential Delaware Supreme Court also closed out the 1980s with a very high-
profile decision—involving a battle for Time, Inc.—that strongly endorsed
management defensive measures in response to hostile bids.65 That deci-
sion, moreover, emphasized that corporate directors were legally responsi-
58. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1862, 1862–64, 1910–12 (1989) (discussing the effect of federal and state statutes on takeovers).
59. See Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2246–47 (1992) (describing this deregulatory viewpoint).
60. See id. These “law and econ” proponents also were the persons who renewed the long-
slumbering aggregation theory of the corporation by means of their “nexus of contracts” concep-
tion. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1158–64; see David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013).
61. See Victor F. Zonana, Milken to Pay $500 M, Serve 40 Months Under Settlement, THE
TECH, http://tech.mit.edu/V112/N9/milken.09w.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
62. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 58, at 1862 n.3.
63. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 33, at 245.
64. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
65. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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ble for directing the “corporation’s” best interests and that such company
interests were not necessarily the same as those of investors seeking a near-
term premium for their stock.66 This entity conception of the corporation,
like the Supreme Court’s endorsement of state power over the design of
corporate attributes in the CTS decision, stood in stark contrast to—and in
repudiation of—the revived private-bargain “aggregate” theory advanced
by economics-oriented corporate law scholars.
With both legislation and judicial decisions strongly favoring incum-
bent management, proinvestor activists in the 1990s necessarily shifted
their focus from pure capital market-centered approaches to more tradi-
tional voice/vote governance methods. Although this required an overcom-
ing of traditional shareholder passivity, doing so became more likely given
the growing concentration of corporate stock in the hands of institutional
investors during the late twentieth century, a trend that continues today.67
As recently noted by Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, tradi-
tional institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds have
become even more active in the twenty-first century and have been joined
by (or are led by) activist hedge funds, which benefit greatly from partner-
ing with more traditional and permanent investors.68 This heightened activ-
ism was legally facilitated by 1992 amendments to federal proxy rules that
freed institutional investors to more easily (and economically) share their
views with one another on incumbent directors up for re-election and on
strategic structural issues.69 Moreover, by 2008, activist investors using
SEC Rule 14a-8 to advance proshareholder proposals saw a marked in-
crease both in the number of such proposals receiving a majority of share-
holder support and in the number actually adopted.70 This proxy success
has accompanied a significant decline in the number of staggered (“classi-
fied”) boards and the dramatic rise of majority voting for directors in the
first decade of the twenty-first century. Both of these developments make
corporate boards far more sensitive to shareholder concerns.71
These and other “proinvestor” developments, such as tougher NYSE
listing standards and the end of discretionary voting by brokers,72 combine
with the governance reforms in Dodd-Frank73—and recent SEC proxy ac-
66. See id. at 1150, 1154.
67. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 40, at 520.
68. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 998–1005
(2010). See Emily Glazer & Joann S. Lublin, Funds Get Active Over Director Pay, WALL ST. J.
(May 21, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732339820457848914083
1989094 (“Now, mutual-fund firms, which normally have aligned with management, are adding
muscle to activist efforts.”).
69. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 68, at 1013–15.
70. See id. at 1012.
71. See id. at 1049.
72. See id. at 1015–16, 1022–23.
73. See supra notes 41–46.
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cess initiatives thereunder74—to substantially bolster modern investor
voice/vote in corporate governance. This raises a host of important issues
for modern corporate governance such as the optimal balance of power
among investors, directors and managers, and the appropriate relationship
between federal and state law in producing corporate governance rules.
Only one issue in particular will be noted here, however, because it directly
pertains to the subject of corporate responsibility as viewed historically.
Today, boards of public companies, for the reasons noted, seem far
more receptive to shareholder concerns than was true for much of the twen-
tieth century. In fact, it was the perceived lack of director responsiveness to
investor interests noted by Berle and Means that sustained corporate law
scholarship as a viable field of inquiry during most of the twentieth cen-
tury.75 To be sure, much corporate misconduct over the past several years—
as in periods before—greatly harmed investors.76 And, the reputations of
corporate elites have taken a dramatic social beating in the twenty-first cen-
tury due to repeated scandals and costly market miscues, coupled with lav-
ish compensation packages. Thus, in 2013, corporate directors and
managers do not enjoy especially broad popularity or have wide societal
support and understanding. Consequently, utterly unlike the 1980s when
managers successfully resisted hostile takeovers by rhetorically champion-
ing noninvestor interests,77 managers today have largely been unable to
muster strong credible resistance to various measures heralded as “good for
investors” and as a necessary countervailing force to powerful managers.
Perhaps this is because business norms have dramatically shifted over the
past several years so that more managers have come to agree with those
investors who want corporations to mainly (or exclusively) focus on inves-
tor well-being. Alternatively, even if many managers still disagree with
such a narrow focus—and would prefer a broader, more responsible vision
of corporate endeavor—perhaps they believe it is often futile (and against
self-interest) to resist a share price-maximizing strategy pushed by a deter-
mined group of activists. Whatever the explanation, as the investor voice is
being amplified within the modern corporation in relation to managers,78
74. On August 25, 2010, the SEC amended the proxy rules to facilitate certain shareholders
placing director nominees on the company’s proxy statement. Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 9136, 2010 WL 3343532 (Aug. 25, 2010). The
SEC voluntarily suspended the effectiveness of its rules pending the outcome of a lawsuit chal-
lenging the legality of the changes by the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce.
The rule was struck down in 2011 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and was not
reproposed by the SEC. See Business Roundtable v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
75. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 223–26 (describing the fiduciary duty of a director
to his corporation).
76. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
77. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 33, at 245.
78. During the 2013 proxy season, investors continued to advocate for governance changes.
For example, both Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. and Glass Lewis & Co., influential
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this apparent corporate governance triumph (long sought by many) simply
opens a new chapter in the broader saga of corporate responsibility and
raises this question: Is this historic re-empowerment of investors, vis a´ vis
managers, a socially desirable outcome?
D. Shareholder Power and Corporate Responsibility
As noted recently by Professors Bratton and Wachter, shareholder em-
powerment was not one of the political outcomes envisioned by Berle and
Means’ iconic 1932 depiction of relationships within the modern corpora-
tion.79 That book certainly began with the well-known description of how
stock ownership had become separated from corporate control, the very
separation that recent shareholder empowerment developments are working
to overcome in the twenty-first century. Berle and Means saw tighter alle-
giance to shareholder interests as undoubtedly superior to unfettered mana-
gerial power but not automatically equivalent to the most socially desirable
outcome.80 They considered the de facto shareholder surrender of control
and responsibility as meaning shareholders also had surrendered the right to
have the corporation operated in their sole interest.81 It is highly unlikely
they envisioned a twenty-first century world of dramatically heightened
shareholder power. Professors Bratton and Wachter believe that Berle in
particular would not fundamentally alter his belief that a public corporation
should broadly serve societal goals, since powerful institutional investors
simply represent one set of oligarchs replacing another—corporate
managers.82
The very basic question of corporate purpose, in other words,
resurfaces yet again—in a new corporate governance guise—in the twenty-
proxy advisory firms, joined in a rare united endorsement of a rival slate of directors for Hess
Corporation earlier proposed by 4.5% shareholder Elliott Management Corp. See Liz Hoffman,
ISS Backs Crusader Elliott in Hess Board Fight, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles/4385
64/iss-backs-crusader-elliott-in-hess-board-fight (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). Even Jamie Dimon,
powerful CEO and Chair of J.P. Morgan Corp., faced a Glass Lewis and ISS proposal that Dimon
relinquish the chairmanship. See Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Should Replace Most of Board, Glass
Lewis Says, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/jpmorgan-should-split-
chairman-and-ceo-roles-glass-lewis-says.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014). On May 21, 2013,
shareholders of J.P. Morgan rejected that proposal. See Dan Fitzpatrick, et al., Vote Strengthens
Dimon’s Grip—J.P. Morgan Shareholders Reject Proposal to Divide Top Posts; Board Under
Fire, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2013, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001
424127887324787004578496814286493352.
79. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of
The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 855 (2010).
80. See id.
81. See Erika George, See No Evil? Revisiting Early Visions of the Social Responsibility of
Business: Adolf A. Berle’s Contribution to Contemporary Conversations, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
965, 976 (2010).
82. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 79, at 862–64. Berle believed the corporation should
serve broad societal goals, not simply investor welfare, even though as a pragmatic governance
matter, he thought managers should focus on investors to constrain managerial discretion. See
Berle, Corporate Managers, supra note 12.
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first century. Moreover, it has become even more acute than in the eco-
nomic doldrums of the 1930s or during the 1980s takeover frenzy precisely
because the shareholder voice now—unlike then—is so much more promi-
nent within contemporary corporate governance. Thus, in apparently recti-
fying a longstanding internal corporate governance problem—i.e.,
achieving accountability to shareholders—the recent rise of shareholder
power unavoidably reinvites attention to broader social concerns largely ne-
glected by state corporate laws, and federal securities laws, traditionally
narrow ambit of concern.
As early as 1959, Professor Chayes wrote critically—more than fifty
years before the latest developments—about what he considered to be the
SEC’s misguided efforts to revitalize shareholder democracy.83 Acknowl-
edging that investors, of course, should be assured of full information and
be protected against fraud and manipulation by those in control of corpora-
tions, Chayes was dismissive of the idea that shareholders were the best
social mechanism for keeping corporate power responsible:
Of all those standing in relation to the large corporation, the
shareholder is least subject to its power. Through the mechanism
of the security markets, his relation to the corporation is rendered
highly abstract and formal, quite limited in scope, and readily re-
ducible to monetary terms. The market affords him a way of
breaking this relation that is simple and effective. He can sell his
stock, and remove himself, qua shareholder, at least from the
power of the corporation.
Shareholder democracy, so-called, is misconceived because the
shareholders are not the governed of the corporation whose con-
sent must be sought. If they are, it is only in the most limited
sense. Their interests are protected if financial information is
made available, fraud and overreaching are prevented, and a mar-
ket is maintained in which their shares may be sold. A priori,
there is no reason for them to have any voice, direct or representa-
tional, in the catalogue of corporate decisions with which this pa-
per began, decisions on prices, wages, and investment. They are
no more affected than nonshareholding neighbors by these
decisions.84
Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, unfolding de-
velopments in the law of corporate governance—state and federal—still
take no direct heed of broad corporate responsibility concerns in regular
business corporations because corporate governance remains a closed sys-
tem of just three groups—investors, directors, and managers. Twentieth
century calls for directors and managers to be more socially responsible
took place against an assumed backdrop of relative shareholder impotence,
83. See Chayes, supra note 14, at 40.
84. Id. at 40–41.
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with the key contested issue being how powerful corporate elites should
best reconcile—in theory and practice—investor and noninvestor interests
to assure both financial success and societal legitimacy. Rising shareholder
power, and director-manager efforts to accommodate it, mean the historical
corporate responsibility approach of focusing solely on director-manager
volunteerism or external legal regulation of the corporation needs rethink-
ing. Perhaps, moreover, calls for broadly responsible conduct will work bet-
ter for private companies than for those having publicly traded securities
because private companies do not face such intense capital market or share-
holder voting pressures. Perhaps, too, the corporate responsibility focus in
the public corporation will migrate (or broaden) to include calls for more
fully exploring—culturally and legally—the “social responsibility” aspects
of share ownership. Just as ownership of real property is far more exten-
sively regulated than one hundred years ago, given rather obvious negative
externalities associated with modern land use, perhaps more hegemonic
share ownership in the future will not carry unfettered rights. Indeed, the
state law effort to curb takeover activity in the 1980s was, in essence, a
legal curtailment of unhindered shareholder ability to exit the corporation
en masse.85
In short, heightened shareholder activism of the kind witnessed today
may reduce agency costs and tighten accountability of directors and manag-
ers to investors as a corporate governance matter, but it may also usher in
new concerns. Shareholders are heterogeneous in their preferences,86 in-
cluding as to their preferred time horizon, and empowered minority share-
holders might seek special preferences for themselves, possibly at the
expense of other shareholders or stakeholders.87 Although Professor Lucian
Bebchuk now argues that investor activism does no real harm to long term
investors, he explicitly does not consider the effects of activism on
noninvestor constituencies.88 If certain intracorporate interests do clash,
then, as has repeatedly happened before with respect to strong corporate
managers, the debate will center on whether voluntary self-restraint by mus-
cle-flexing hedge funds and other activist investors will suffice, or whether
novel legal regulation will be called for, such as an imposition of newly-
contoured fiduciary duties on active shareholders, tougher disclosure re-
85. See Johnson, supra note 59, at 2224 (discussing state law changes to shareholder
characteristics).
86. See Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1370–72 (2010).
87. See id. This heterogeneity extends to the indirect holding of stock by many Americans in
retirement accounts. See Anne M. Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Par-
adigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1299, 1305, 1326 (2012) (discussing the ability of mutual fund managers to represent inves-
tors’ interests).
88. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1644 nn. 26–27 (2013).
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quirements,89 tenured voting,90 longer terms of office for directors,91 or yet
other measures.
E. The New Benefit Corporation Statutes
If the skimpy existent mechanisms of corporate governance do not
themselves accommodate a modern society’s evolving expectations of cor-
porate power—whether control lies in investor or manager hands, or is held
jointly—then it is to be expected that renewed efforts to somehow bring
noninvestor voices (and concerns) into corporate governance will begin
again, or that even more extensive legal regulation or reform addressing
various kinds of such interests will be forthcoming. One striking example of
this former phenomenon is the new “benefit corporation” statutes spreading
across the country, including in Delaware.92 These statutes, which represent
an avowed rejection of a strict and exclusive focus on investor welfare,
expressly permit corporate directors to craft corporate strategy in a way that
both benefits investors and advances a larger general or specific social and
environmental purpose.93 Whether and how this effort to address corporate
responsibility through corporate governance reform will alter the govern-
ance of regular business corporations remains to be seen. What is clear,
however, is that, today, for the first time since the late nineteenth century,
the corporate governance realm itself has been used by state law to address
the larger issue of corporate responsibility.
89. See Rose, supra note 86, at 1401–04.
90. See Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37
IOWA J. CORP. L. 265, 350–55 (2012).
91. See Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1658–59 (2011).
92. See generally Johnson, Pluralism, supra note 2 (discussing the dual purpose of benefit
corporations to produce profits and further social goals). Delaware passed a benefit corporation
statute which became effective on August 1, 2013. 79 Del. Laws ch. 122 (2013) (codified at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (2013)).
93. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2013). Various noninvestor interests also may be given
regard by directors.
